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ADULTS INVOLVED IN MAINE’S JUSTICE SYSTEM
Christopher Northrop, Jill Ward, Jonathan Ruterbories, & Jess Mizzi*
ABSTRACT
While many aspects of Maine’s Juvenile Justice system are ripe for reform, this
Article advocates for improving the system’s response to one group of offenders
often overlooked by policymakers: emerging adults. The Supreme Court, in Roper
v. Simmons, stated that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18.” In fact, studies have shown that criminal
conduct attributable to the unstable and impulsive nature of the adolescent mind
continues well into a person’s mid-twenties.
These eighteen to twenty-five-year-old offenders, termed “emerging adults” by
researchers, experience much of the same developmental and physiological
challenges as their younger, system involved counterparts, yet they are treated as if
they are fully developed in the eyes of the law. Thus, emerging adults—without any
sound scientific or legal justification—are exempt from many of the systemic
protections offered to system involved youth under the age of eighteen. This is the
case in Maine, resulting in poor outcomes for the state’s emerging adults who come
in contact with law enforcement. Overrepresentation of minority groups, and
prolonged system involvement are just some of the deficits of Maine’s current model.
To produce better outcomes, there must be a holistic, individualized, and
supportive systemic response that considers the needs of emerging adults on an
individual basis and refers them to appropriate rehabilitative services. This Article
proposes two reforms aimed at improving outcomes for Maine’s emerging adult
population: (1) raising the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction to age twentyone and expanding the continuum of supports and services the juvenile justice system
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own work. Our press for systemic change did not start with—and will not end—with us. Thank you to
all those who will continue to advocate for reform long after this piece is published. We would also like
to thank the Maine Law Review editing team. Of course, any errors you may find in this work are our
own. Above all, we would like to express our gratitude to former and current system involved young
people whose resilience and expertise has inspired us. Their courage to share their lived experience with
others has shaped the ideas at the very core of this piece. Without their strength, perseverance, and
persistence we would not have made the strides we have in the fight for a fairer system of youth justice.
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provides this group, and (2) protecting emerging adults ages twenty-one to twentyfive from the most punitive sanctions of Maine’s Criminal Code.
INTRODUCTION
In the face of progressive juvenile justice policies around the country and
emerging research on adolescent brain development, Maine’s juvenile justice system
remains largely stagnant. An operational youth prison combined with a lack of
community resources continue to produce diminishing returns for Maine youth.
While multiple attempts at reform continue with varying degrees of success, there
remains a need for a fundamental shift in Maine’s approach to youth justice. One
idea—explained in more detail in this Article—would be to institute an approach to
youthful offenders that allows for a more individualized rehabilitative response to
young or emerging adults who come in contact with the criminal legal system.
Currently, resources for youth come into contact with police are scarce, and access
to these limited resources is even harder to obtain. The scarcity of resources lands
especially hard on older youth and emerging adults who struggle with maintaining
housing, health, and education for their children.12 All of this is further exacerbated
for youth and emerging adults of color who experience discriminatory and overly
aggressive policing that criminalizes their behavior and subjects them to the
inequities and harms of justice system involvement.3 Ideally, an effective approach
to assisting this population would aggregate community resources and individually
respond to the needs of youth, connecting them with helpful resources before system
involvement in an attempt to divert them away from further trouble.4
Specifically, age-appropriate resources are particularly lacking for youth
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five (often referred to as “emerging
adults”),5 making it difficult for them to successfully transition into adulthood. The
Supreme Court, in Roper v. Simmons, stated that “[t]he qualities that distinguish
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns [eighteen].”6 In fact,
studies have shown that juveniles are still developing and do not approach complete

1. LAEL CHESTER & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGING ADULTS IN
CONNECTICUT: PROVIDING EFFECTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE RESPONSES FOR YOUTH
UNDER AGE 21 12 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Malcolm Wiener Ctr. for Soc. Pol’y ed., 2016), https://www.
hks.harvard.edu/centers/wiener/programs/criminaljustice/research-publications/young-adultjustice/public-safety-and-emerging-adults-in-connecticut [https://perma.cc/9KTV-73SV].
2. See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCH. 469, 469 (2000).
3. See generally KRISTEN HENNING, THE RAGE OF INNOCENCE: HOW AMERICA CRIMINALIZES
BLACK YOUTH xvii-xviii (2021) (“[A] book about the criminalization of Black adolescence in America.
It is a book about the excessive intrusion of police into the lives of Black teenagers and the intolerant—
sometimes deadly—reactions that police and civilians have toward Black children . . . . It is about
survival and success in the face of pervasive injustice—well beyond anything that is expected of White
middle-class youth who enjoy the privileges of physical safety, public affirmation, and protracted periods
of academic and social freedom.”).
4. Id. at 15.
5. See Arnett, supra note 2. The phrase “emerging adulthood” was initially coined by psychologist
Jeffrey Arnett as “a new conception of development for the period from the late teens through the twenties,
with a focus on ages 18–25.” Id.
6. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
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brain development until they reach their mid-twenties.7 In Miller v. Alabama, the
Court recognized this science and found that youth are subject to “diminished
culpability” and have “greater prospects for reform.”8 Yet, despite these studies and
the clear application of the developmental research to young adults over age
eighteen, emerging adults are treated as if they are fully developed adults in the eyes
of the law.9
Emerging adults involved in the justice system have been negatively impacted
by the absence of a culturally responsive, age-appropriate, individualized approach
that reflects the most recent science on adolescent brain development. In truth, the
current approach has fallen short in meeting the needs of crime victims and broader
public safety goals.10 Overrepresentation of youth of color, immigrant youth,
LGBTQ+ youth, youth with disabilities, and tribal youth, as well as high recidivism
rates and prolonged system involvement are just some of the poor outcomes
experienced in Maine and across the country.11 When a young person comes in
contact with law enforcement, there must be a holistic response that considers the
needs of that youth on an individual basis and holds them accountable in a way that
is supportive, healing, and rehabilitative consistent with the purposes of Maine’s
Juvenile Code. This Article proposes that Maine should adopt a comprehensive,
individually responsive approach to youthful offenders that embraces the latest
science in the field of adolescent development and shifts juvenile justice in Maine
toward a more progressive and evidence-based model. This Article analyzes two
specific options for accomplishing this: (1) raising the age of original juvenile court
jurisdiction to age twenty-one and expanding the continuum of supports and services
the juvenile justice system provides this group, and (2) protecting emerging adults
ages twenty-one to twenty-five from the most punitive sanctions of Maine’s Criminal
Code.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Rule of Sevens
Much of the American legal system was adapted from English common law.
This is no different in the context of juvenile justice. Under the common law of
England in the 15th Century, children under the age of seven “were conclusively
presumed incapable of forming criminal intent, and thus could not be guilty of

7. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Mills et al., Developmental Changes in the Structure of the Social Brain in
Late Childhood and Adolescence, 9 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 123, 129-30 (2014).
8. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
9. Ann Tiegen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NCSL (Apr. 8, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-toadult-court-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/6MEB-K8BE].
10. See generally DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A
ROAD TO REPAIR 7-15 (2019).
11. See VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED RESPONSES TO JUSTICE-INVOLVED YOUNG
ADULTS (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Program in Crim. Just. Pol’y & Mgmt. ed., 2015), https://www.prison
policy.org/scans/ESCC-CommunityBasedResponsesJusticeInvolvedYA.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9FG-G8
Q9].
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crimes.”12 Children between the ages of seven and fourteen “were also presumed
incapable of forming criminal intent.”13 However, this was a rebuttable presumption
and if it could be shown that a child was able to distinguish between right and wrong,
then the child could be held liable for criminal activity.14 Whereas, “[a] child over
the age of fourteen was presumed to be able to form criminal intent and was held to
the same level of responsibility for criminal wrongdoing as an adult.”15 The Rule of
Sevens was the foundational approach to how the law addressed children that had
been accused of criminal activity.
At this point in England’s history, there were no separate juvenile courts.16
Essentially, a child “between the ages of seven and fourteen who was accused of a
crime (and found fit for trial) would be tried in an adult criminal court”17 and would
receive the same sentence as an adult if ultimately convicted.18 Children received no
special treatment and were often housed alongside adults convicted of crimes.19 In
fact, young offenders faced equally as harsh punishments—including capital
punishment—as their adult counterparts.20
The English system for juvenile justice—or lack thereof—was directly
transported to the American Colonies.21 During the time of the Colonies, three
general sources of ethos combined to create the foundation of American law that
exists today: (1) the importation of English folk-law or common law; (2) the “norms
and practices that developed on this side of the Atlantic . . . that had no English
counterpart”; and (3) the general norms and practices that were developed because
of who the colonists were, namely Puritans.22 As a result, the inherited juvenile
justice system included some slight, but harsh, modifications. For instance, there
was “no exemption from criminal culpability for children under the age of seven.”23
In general, fewer offenses were punishable by death, but many still were—including
some that only applied to children.24 For example, a rebellious or stubborn son of
“sufficient years and understanding,” could be put to death for repeatedly disobeying
their parents.25 It is also important to note that, at this time, poverty was viewed as
a vice (arguably a viewpoint that persists today), and impoverished children were
thus removed from their homes and placed in poorhouses alongside adults who had
committed crimes.26

12. J. ERIC SMITHBURN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN JUVENILE LAW 1 (2d ed. 2013).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1-2.
21. Id. at 1.
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 3 (4th ed. 2019).
23. SMITHBURN, supra note 12, at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id.; see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1191 (1970) [hereinafter Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform].
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B. The Reform Era, Parens Patriae, and the First Juvenile Courts
This harsh system of dealing with children that had committed crimes, or by
happenstance were poor and neglected, lasted into the 19th Century. In response,
the Reformers, or child savers, who believed that “children were especially amenable
to treatment and rehabilitation . . . sought to institute these ideals in place of the
prevailing notions of punishment and incarceration.”27
In 1823, a report by the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of
New York specifically “called for the rescue of children from a future of crime and
degradation.”28 These same Reformers had also previously drawn public attention
to the harms and “corruptive results” of locking up children with “mature
criminals.”29 Thus, the first House of Refuge was formed in New York in 1824 and
was quickly replicated in several states.30 These Houses of Refuge were to replace
the workhouses, poorhouses, apprenticeships, and incarceration that had previously
been used to address criminal behavior in youth.31
Though these Houses of Refuge were an ideological step in the right direction
for dealing with youth, they were not free from fault and still possessed many
shortcomings. One critique of these Houses of Refuge is that, although they
separated youth from adults, they were still a form of incarceration that continued to
house criminally culpable youth alongside youth that had been removed from their
homes due to neglect.32 Furthermore, the subjective nature of youth admission to
Houses of Refuge resulted in the perpetuation of systemic racial and economic
oppression.33 Reformers focused their attention on “proper objects,” or youth they
deemed were still worth rescuing and not permanently incorrigible.34 They believed
it was necessary to turn away youth that were “prematurely corrupted” and, in turn,
corrupting the other youth due to the imitative nature of youth.35
Another critique is that the custody rights of parents were often ignored when it
came to a youth being placed in a House of Refuge.36 In the case of Ex parte Crouse,
a habeas corpus petition by a father for the return of his infant daughter from a House
of Refuge was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.37 The court stated that
“[t]he right of parental control is a natural, but not an unalienable one.”38 Thus, if
parents failed to exercise their rights and raise their child in an “appropriate” manner,

27. Id.
28. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 26, at 1189.
29. Id.
30. SMITHBURN, supra note 12, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6.
33. See GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
47-77 (2012).
34. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 26, at 1190.
35. Id.
36. SMITHBURN, supra note 12, at 6; see also Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
37. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11-12 (Pa. 1839).
38. Id. at 11.

2022]

EMERGING ADULTS

249

the State had the power to step in and take control of the situation.39 This power to
step in came from the parens patriae doctrine, literally “parent of the country.”40
To continue to justify removing youth—both youth that violated state laws and
youth whose parents were deemed neglectful—from their homes, Reformers worked
to expand the parens patriae doctrine. This expansion led directly to the creation of
state child welfare programs41 and the Supreme Court explicitly stating that parens
patriae was “inherent in the supreme power of every state . . . for the prevention of
injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”42
The paternal treatment of youth by the state continued to grow. It was a
fundamental tenet of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 that led to the creation
of one of the first separate juvenile court systems in the nation.43 The Act gave this
newly formed juvenile court the jurisdiction over youth that committed offenses and
directed that “the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly
as may be that which should be given by its parents.”44 However, this paternalistic
approach also led to a removal of “the rigidities of criminal procedure [from] the life
of juvenile delinquents” and imbued this new separate juvenile court with a certain
sense of informality.45 Illinois was merely the launching point of a separate juvenile
court system, and this, too, was soon replicated in other states.46 Though there was
some critique of the informality of the early juvenile courts and a fear that the
underlying parens patriae doctrine led to an abuse of power, separate juvenile court
systems that embodied this paternalistic informality continued to develop around the
country.47
C. The Supreme Court and Juvenile Reform
Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court directly addressed the lack of structure that
plagued the juvenile courts when it wrote “[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”48 In re Gault is the pivotal Supreme
Court case that addressed the lack of due process protections that were afforded to
youth involved in delinquency proceedings. The facts and procedural posture of this
case highlight the extremes that the parens patriae doctrine had reached in
addressing youth in an informal manner.
Gerald Gault was a fifteen-year-old when he and a friend were taken into
custody by the Sherriff of Gila County, Arizona, for allegedly making “lewd or

39. See id.
40. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE, 17
(6th ed. 2017)
41. Id. at 18.
42. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57
(1890).
43. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, supra note 26, at 1211-12; see also Sanford J. Fox, A Contribution
to the History of the American Juvenile Court, 49 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 7, 9 (1998) [hereinafter Fox,
American Juvenile Court].
44. Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, §§ 1-2, 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 132, 137.
45. Fox, American Juvenile Court, supra note 43, at 9.
46. See id. at 10.
47. Id. at 12-13.
48. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
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indecent remarks” to a neighbor over the telephone.49 Gerald was taken into custody
while his parents were at work, and his parents did not learn that he was in custody
until they sent his brother looking for him later that day.50 When Gerald’s mother
went to the detention home where Gerald was being held, an officer, Officer Flagg,
verbally notified her that a hearing would be held at the Juvenile Court the next day,
on June 9, 1964.51 Officer Flagg subsequently filed a petition with the court the next
day, however, this petition was not served on the Gaults and none of the family saw
the petition until a habeas corpus hearing two months later.52 This petition lacked
any reference to any factual basis for the judicial action which it started and merely
stated that Gerald was a juvenile that was “in need of the protection” of the court and
that he was a “delinquent minor.”53 The proceedings on June 9, 1964, happened
before a juvenile judge in chambers, and all the information about these proceedings
came from the subsequent habeas corpus hearing in August because no record or
transcript was made.54 Gerald was directly questioned by the judge about the phone
call, and there was some conflict about how he had responded: Mrs. Gault recalled
Gerald stating that he dialed the phone and handed it to his friend, whereas Officer
Flagg testified that Gerald admitted to making lewd remarks.55 After this
proceeding, Gerald was returned to the detention home and was not released for
another two-to-three days.56 Upon his release, Gerald’s mother received a note, “on
plain paper, not letterhead,” from Officer Flagg stating that there would be another
proceeding on June 15, 1964.57 At this proceeding, the neighbor-complainant was
again not present and there was still conflict as to what Gerald’s previous testimony
was due to the lack of a record.58 Ultimately, the juvenile judge committed Gerald
as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School until he was twenty-one years
of age.59
No appeal was permitted by Arizona law in juvenile cases at this time.60 On
August 3, 1964, a writ of habeas was filed with the Arizona Supreme Court, and on
August 17, 1964, the habeas proceedings occurred in the Superior Court.61 The
juvenile judge was cross-examined and stated that he found Gerald delinquent under
a specific statute which, if committed by an adult, would carry a fine ranging from
$5 to $50 and imprisonment for up to two months.62 Under this judge’s ruling,

49. Id. at 4-5.
50. Id.
51. Id. It is also important to note that Officer Flagg was the arresting officer, the superintendent of
the detention home, a witness in the case, and the acting District Attorney. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 5-6.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8-9.
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Gerald was effectively committed for six years.63 Despite this, the Superior Court
dismissed the writ of habeas corpus.64 The Gaults appealed, but the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.65 Finally, Gerald’s case made its way before
the Supreme Court of the United States.66
The first question before the Supreme Court was whether youth accused of
crimes in delinquency proceedings needed to be afforded the same due process rights
as adults, including the right to a timely notice of charges, to counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him, to a transcript of the proceedings, to
appellate review, and to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination.67 The
Court answered this question affirmatively to all of the rights listed with the
exception of the right to a transcript of the proceedings and a right to appellate
review, which they did not answer.68 The second underlying question before the
Court was whether the due process standard had been met in Gerald Gault’s case.69
The Court held that this standard had not been met.70
In answering these questions, the Supreme Court directly addressed the history
of juvenile courts and the flawed paternal approach that directly led to the due
process violations that Gault suffered.71 The Court explained that the early
informalities were due to the view that youth, unlike adults, had a right “not to
liberty, but to custody,” and this lack of rights for the youth allowed parens patriae
to take hold so the states could serve as protectors.72 The Court went on to state that
“Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure.”73 The Court specifically pointed out that “the absence of substantive
standards” did not mean that youth received “careful, compassionate, [and]
individualized treatment,” and that “[d]epartures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.”74
Additionally, the Court noted that the implementation of constitutional due process
rights into the juvenile system would in no way impair the unique benefit of that
separate system, and that the rights discussed were procedural in nature.75
Furthermore, the Court quoted a sociological study which observed that “when the
procedural laxness of the ‘parens patriae’ attitude is followed by stern disciplining,
the contrast may have an adverse effect upon the child, who feels that he has been

63. See id. at 7-8 (noting that Gerald was fifteen at the time and the judge committed him to the State
Industrial School for the period of his minority, until age twenty-one, effectively committing him for six
years).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 59.
71. Id. at 14-31.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id. at 18-19.
75. Id. at 22.
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deceived or enticed.”76 The Court noted that the study concluded that unless due
process is followed, even youth that have violated the law may in turn feel as if they
have been wronged by the system and thus resistant to its rehabilitative efforts.77
Since In re Gault, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the constitutional
protections available to system-involved youth, delivering youth-centered analyses
in both its Fourth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
the Court held that age is a relevant factor to consider when determining whether a
youth is in police custody for Miranda purposes because age affects a person’s ability
to make mature judgments.78 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of
eighteen when they committed their crimes.79 In Graham v. Florida, the Court
concluded that youth offenders cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole for non-homicide offenses.80 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for youth homicide
offenders is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.81
This ruling applied even to the youth who committed murder before the age of
eighteen.82 Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court determined that Miller
should be applied retroactively.83 This meant that over two thousand individuals
could challenge their sentence of life without parole for crimes they committed when
they were not yet eighteen.84
However, most recently, in Jones v. Mississippi, the Court halted this progress.85
In that case, the Court held that states maintain discretion to sentence juveniles who
commit homicide to life sentences without parole and do not need to make a separate
assessment and finding of “permanent incorrigibility.”86 As long as the life sentence
without parole is discretionary, and not mandatory, it neither violates the
Constitution nor runs counter to the Court’s holding in Miller—stymying thousands
of retroactive applications brought pursuant to Montgomery by youth sentenced
discretionarily.87 Thus, the Court made clear that it is up to a state’s legislature, not
the Supreme Court, to determine sentencing relief for youth offenders.88
Collectively, these cases highlight the expansion of rights for youth that have
committed crimes. They also represent the idea that youth are qualitatively different

76. Id. at 26.
77. Id.
78. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265 (2011); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
80. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
81. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
82. Id.
83. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 200, 208 (2016) (holding that constitutional rules would
apply retroactively and that the holding in Miller is a constitutional—not a procedural—case).
84. Adam Liptak, Justices Expand Parole Rights for Juveniles Sentenced to Life for Murder, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/politics/justices-expand-parole-rightsfor-juveniles-sentenced-to-life-for-murder.html [https://perma.cc/4QDU-CLYB].
85. See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
86. Id. at 1318-19.
87. Id. at 1317.
88. See id. at 1323.
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than adults and, thus, should be treated differently by the systems designed to hold
them accountable. Accepting that youth are different from adults presents two
questions. First, what role did science play in the expansion of rights for youth in
the criminal justice system? Second, how can our legal system appropriately respond
to youthful offenders in a way that is consistent with this science and considerate of
public safety interests? Central to these questions is the legal determination of when
adolescence ends, and adulthood begins.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENCE’S ROLE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
“A teenager is like a car with a great accelerator but terrible brakes.” 89 This
quote encapsulates, in metaphorical terms, the increased understanding that the legal
community has of an adolescent’s brain.90 In fact, the term adolescent itself has
significantly changed in meaning over the years.91 While the traditional
understanding set forth in most United States jurisdictions is that adolescent
development ends at the age of eighteen, it is now more commonly understood that
the brain continues development through the age of twenty-five, and perhaps, even
later.92 Concurrent with this expanded definition of the term adolescent, attitudes
towards emerging adults between ages eighteen and twenty-five involved in the
criminal legal system have also shifted.93 The evolution of scientific evidence
showing that the brain of an emerging adult is not physiologically comparable to that
of an adult offender indicates that emerging adults do not possess the culpability that
adult criminal codes and legal systems intend to address.94 The recognition of these
physiological differences and the resulting decreased culpability of adolescent
offenders have begun a slow but steady shift in policy that modifies the ways that
law enforcement and prosecutors hold young people accountable.
Informed by new scientific developments, legal systems across the country have
taken substantial steps toward altering the harsher and more punitive sentencing
schemes borne out of the Superpredator Era.95 These alterations have resulted in
more rehabilitative and less punitive schemes intended to impose developmentally

89. Lizzie Buchen, Arrested Development, 484 NATURE 304, 305 (2012).
90. See id.
91. See generally Susan Sawyer et al., The Age of Adolescence, 2 LANCET CHILD & ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 223 (2018) (summarizing the scientific and policy-based reasons for expanding the definition of
the term adolescence to encompass a greater percentage of the young adult population).
92. See id. at 223-26.
93. See
generally
Recent
Reforms,
EMERGING
ADULT
JUST.
PROJECT,
https://www.eajustice.org/recent-reforms [https://perma.cc/JH8D-U7UM] (last visited May 13, 2022)
(summarizing the various models of specialized reform targeted at emerging adults).
94. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH.
1009, 1015-16 (2003) (“[Y]outhful criminal choices may share much in common with those of adults
whose criminal behavior is treated as less blameworthy than that of the typical offender.”).
95. The Superpredator Myth, 25 Years Later, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2014), https://eji.org/
news/superpredator-myth-20-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/E2GL-JUTA]. The term “superpredator” was
coined by criminologists in the 1990’s who predicted that by 2010, there would be an estimated 270,000
more young predators on the streets than in 1990. Id. These predictions which had heavy racial overtones,
set off a panic fueled by highly publicized heinous crimes that led to legislation across the country, which
dramatically increased the treatment of juveniles as adults for purposes of sentencing and punishment. Id.

254

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

appropriate accountability measures.96 This policy shift can be seen both in
legislative reforms and in reimagined policies of state agencies. Perhaps it is most
prominently recognized in the jurisprudence of American courts. Various state
courts have recognized the enhanced role science should play in the punishment of
adolescent offenders,97 as well as the United States Supreme Court. As mentioned
above, in a couple significant—and fairly recent—decisions, the Court has relied
heavily on information presented by the scientific community in holding that young
people who commit crimes should be treated differently than adults who commit
them.98
In Roper, the Court recognized three general differences between juveniles and
adults.99 First, the Court stated that “as any parent knows, and as the scientific and
sociological studies that respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often than in adults.’”100 These specific qualities, the majority continued, “result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,” and it has been noted that
juveniles are “overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless
behavior.”101
Second, the Court noted that juvenile offenders are more susceptible to outside
pressures in part because young offenders “have less control, or less experience with
control, over their own environment.”102 This lack of control stems from the fact
that youth is a “time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage.”103
Third and finally, the Court noted that the character of a young person is not as
well formed as that of an adult.104 “The personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory, [and] less fixed,” giving them a greater claim than adults to be forgiven
for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.105 “From a
moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those
of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will
be reformed.”106
The focus of the Roper decision was narrow, and it applied only to the ability of
courts to sentence a youth to death for a crime committed before the age of

96. See EMERGING ADULT JUST. PROJECT, supra note 93.
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (holding that findings of permanent
incorrigibility were required in order to sentence juveniles to life in prison without the possibility of
parole) abrogated by Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022); see also State v. JR, 2018 ME
117, ¶ 33, 191 A.3d 1157 (Saufley, C.J., concurring) (addressing the lack of evidence based resources for
justice system involved youth in Maine).
98. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
99. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
100. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
101. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12
Developmental Rev. 339, 339 (1992)).
102. Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, supra note 94).
103. Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
104. Id. at 570.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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eighteen.107 However, the reasoning was broad, based in science, and opened the
doors for further change.
Then, in Graham v. Florida, the Court recognized that “developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
youth and adult minds.”108 “As compared to adults,” the Court noted, young people
“have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’” which
makes them more “susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure” and is especially impressive upon characters not well
formed.109 These salient and scientific characteristics, “mean that ‘[i]t is difficult
even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’”110
In 2011, on the heels of the Graham decision, the Court in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina affirmed its position that juveniles are a unique class of individuals whose
physiological characteristics produce “commonsense conclusions” that young
people are different from adults.111 In holding that the age of an individual is a
relevant factor in a Miranda custody analysis, the Court stated that such
conclusions—that youth are physiologically and fundamentally different—are “selfevident to anyone who was a child once himself, including any police officer or
judge.”112 “Describing no one particular child,” the J.D.B. Court noted that their
various observations about adolescence “restate what ‘any parent knows’—indeed
what any person knows—about children generally.”113
A year later, the Court in Miller v. Alabama reaffirmed that juveniles who
commit crimes are fundamentally different from similarly situated adults, noting that
its opinions in Graham and Roper had relied “not only on common sense, but on
science and social science as well.”114
This line of cases has been hailed by system reformers and youth advocates alike
as an important acknowledgment that youth are different from adults and that
adolescent development matters in determining when and where the more punitive
schemes of the adult legal system should apply.115 The Court’s decisions in Roper,
Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, fundamentally altered the ways we respond to and
determine whether and how to punish youth. They set outer limits on the type of
punishment a youth justice system may impose, and did so, in part, because the
unique psychological and physiological characteristics of youth necessitate different
treatment. Each of these decisions is only applicable to juveniles, which means that
the Court’s recognition of adolescent development science is restricted to the context

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 555-56.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
Id. at 272, 281.
Id. at 273 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
See id.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
JUVENILE SENTENCING, 1, 1 (Columbia Univ. ed., 2015).
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of individuals under the age of eighteen.116 However, as the science bears out, the
unique characteristics of young offenders continue well beyond a young person’s
eighteenth birthday.
A. Adolescent Development Science: Defining Youth
Knowing that science has played an important role in the juvenile justice
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it is important to take a full account of the latest
findings and research around adolescent development and the maturing brain.
Research articles in the field of neuroscience have shown that there are indeed
neurobiological differences between the adolescent and adult brain.117 These
differences primarily exist because of the continuous developmental state in which
the adolescent brain remains until it reaches an age of maturity, which studies have
shown generally occurs in a person’s mid-twenties.118
The most substantial contributor to brain development is the post-birth
interactions between the brain’s circuits and its surrounding environment.119 The
adolescent brain’s relative immaturity and malleability allow it to respond to the
complex demands of its environment.120
Between the ages of two and seven, the brain engages with its surrounding
environment by increasing its neuronal connections through a process called
expansion.121 After certain parts of the brain achieve their maximum number of
neuronal connections—usually by the age of seven—the brain begins a process
known as elimination, which results in the slow deletion of certain neuronal
pathways to optimize the brain’s anatomical structure for function within its
environment.122 The process of elimination may last until a person is twenty-five or
thirty years old and the end of this elimination process generally marks the outer
boundary of adolescence.123 The scientific evidence that informed the Court’s
decisions can generally be broken down into three categories: (i) the imbalance
model of brain development, (ii) the prevalence of heightened reward pathways, and
(iii) susceptibility to peer pressure.
1. Imbalance Model of Brain Development
In adolescent development, the teenage and early adult years represent a
particular “period of struggle between seeking independence from parents while still

116. While some states have recently raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, all fifty states utilize
the age of eighteen—or, in some instances, even younger—as the criminal age of majority. See Age
Matrix, INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR JUVS., https://www.juvenilecompact.org/age-matrix [https://perma.cc/
KNL2-TRFZ] (last visited May 13, 2022).
117. See generally Ezequiel Mercurio et al., Adolescent Brain Development and Progressive Legal
Responsibility in the Latin American Context, 11 FRONTIERS IN PSYCH. 1-11 (2020).
118. See Sawyer et al., supra note 91, at 224
119. See Mercurio et al., supra note 117, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id. Expansion is the process of forming new synaptic connections through synaptogenesis, which
allows for adaptation to the physical and social world. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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being dependent on [parents] for many of their basic needs.”124 This struggle is not
unique to humans but is a pattern observed across species.125 During this time of
struggle, “cortical development and functional circuits are highly dynamic.”126 Brain
circuits that seek reward are more active and mature earlier than the cerebral regions
that control behavior, leaving vital portions of adolescent brain circuitry
underdeveloped just as young people enter particularly stimulating social
environments.127
This idea that the emotional and behavioral regulatory regions of the brain
develop at different paces is known as the “imbalance model” of brain
development.128 According to this model, the differential development of the various
regions within the brain can lead to imbalance in their activity.129 This imbalance
produces greater reliance on the more mature emotional regions than on the less
developed behavioral control regions during young adulthood, as compared to both
childhood—when they develop at approximately the same rate—and adulthood—
where both circuits are fully mature.130 When young adults enter situations that are
not emotionally charged, prefrontal behavioral circuitry “helps direct attention and
action toward relevant information while suppressing responses to irrelevant
information, allowing youth to appropriately respond to various environmental
stimuli.”131 In emotionally charged situations, however, the less developed
behavioral circuitry is overrun by the more fully developed emotional regulators,
which can result in a loss of self-control or risky decision making.132 Thus, this
neurobiological immaturity of the adolescent brain may render it more vulnerable to
making poor decisions in emotionally charged contexts, leading to an inappropriate
behavioral response to stimuli.133 The height of this imbalance occurs during an
individual’s late teens and early twenties, resulting in an increase in risky behaviors
that can lead to system involvement.134
2. Heightened Reward Pathways
The irregularity in emotional and behavioral circuitry development is not an
isolated condition; an imbalance also exists between the reward and regulatory
circuitry of an adolescent.135 This imbalance exists because a young person’s
dopamine reward pathway is hypersensitive or overcommitted in response to

124. Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of Developmental
Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 63, 63 (2014).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Mercurio et al., supra note 117, at 3.
128. Cohen & Casey, supra note 124, at 63.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 63-64.
133. Id.
134. See Mercurio et al., supra note 117, at 3.
135. See Adriana Galvan, Adolescent Development of the Reward System, FRONTIERS IN HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE, Feb. 2010, at 1, 1-7.
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rewards, increasing the tendency to seek novelty and sensation.136 This overactivity
can lead to a heightened sensitivity to reward, a more frequent search for reward, and
more oft-occurring sensation seeking behaviors.137 Risk-taking behaviors such as
engaging in heightened sexual activity, drinking in excess, and partaking in high
impact sports have all been correlated with overactive reward-seeking pathways.138
The overactivity of an adolescent’s reward circuitry often provokes such a
strong response that the adolescent finds it difficult to learn to avoid reward-seeking
behaviors or consider the consequences of their actions.139 This presents a marked
difference from developmentally mature adults who often are more capable of
learning from their experiences and appropriately modifying their behaviors.140
The reward and regulatory circuitry imbalance is not constant, and is largely
context dependent—a concept termed “hot and cold cognition” by researchers.141
When an adolescent is in a perceived low stress environment, this imbalance is less
severe and allows youth to make more reasoned, well-balanced and informed
decisions.142 This low stress state of decision making leading to less impulsive and
reward based decisions is known as “cold cognition.”143 When in a high stress
environment, adolescents struggle to make reasoned decisions and lack the ability to
activate the portion of their brain that inhibits impulsive decisions.144 This decision
making under heightened stress is known as “hot cognition.”145 A state of hot
cognition, resulting in an inability to adequately identify the consequences of their
decisions, is where many system-involved emerging adults find themselves in the
moments immediately preceding law enforcement contact.
3. Peer Pressure
During adolescence, peer pressure also plays a key role in inappropriate
behavior.146 “Adolescents engage in riskier behaviors when they are with their peers
than when they are alone.”147 Peer pressure is strongly related to an adolescent’s
increased sensitivity to reward-seeking behavior.148 In fact, the mere presence of
other individuals close in age can increase activity in reward-seeking brain regions,

136. Id. at 1.
137. See Beatriz Luna et al., The Teenage Brain: Cognitive Control and Motivation, 22 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 94, 98 (2013).
138. See Mercurio et al., supra note 117, at 3.
139. Id.
140. Stefano Palminteri et al., The Computational Development of Reinforcement Learning During
Adolescence, PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY, June 20, 2016, at 1, 1-25.
141. RACHEL BARKIN, HOT AND COLD COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING EMERGING ADULTS’
COGNITIVE REASONING 1, 2 (Columbia Univ. Just. Lab. ed., 2021), https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/content/Hot%20and%20Cold%20Cognition.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPV4-G37U].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Mercurio et al, supra note 117, at 3.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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leading to riskier behaviors.149 In their search for the acceptance of their peers,
adolescents are also more vulnerable to pressure and more sensitive to stress than
adults.150
4. Science and Emerging Adults
It is commonly accepted that this science applies to younger individuals in the
youth justice system, and that because of such science, policies should individualize
systemic responses to the unique needs of those under age eighteen. However, the
research is clear that the adolescent brain remains in development well beyond this
arbitrary societal line of age eighteen.151 This conclusion is supported by the
frequently studied and well known “age crime curve,” which posits that unlawful
behavior peaks in the late-teens and early twenties before decreasing significantly in
the mid-twenties.152 For example, in 2019, youth ages ten to twenty-four made up
27% of all arrests.153 That percentage drops to 16.8% for people ages twenty-five to
twenty-nine; 15.1% for people ages thirty to thirty-four; 12.7% for people ages
thirty-five to thirty-nine; 8.8% for people ages forty to forty-four; and continues to
drop significantly as the age range climbs higher.154
It is also important to note that emerging adults are overrepresented in terms of
arrest rates when viewed in comparison to their overall percentage of the population.
Nationally, in 2019, youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four years old
represented 9.3% of the total population in the United States.155 However, according
to statistics from the FBI for that year, the same age group comprised 20% of all
arrests nationwide.156 This overrepresentation is mirrored here in Maine.157
According to census data for 2019, youth ages eighteen to twenty-four years old
represented 7.9% of Maine’s population.158 However, according to the 2019 Crimes
in Maine Annual Report from the State of Maine Department of Public Safety, youth
ages eighteen to twenty-four years old accounted for 18.4% for that same year.159 If
the characteristics of adolescent development science are applicable to both
teenagers and young adults alike, then it follows that the policy responses to this
behavior through the ages of peak criminal activity should be better aligned to
149. Simon Ciranka & Woulter van den Bos, Social Influence in Adolescent Decision-Making: A
Formal Framework, 10 FRONTIERS IN PSYCH., Aug. 2019, at 1-16.
150. See Mercurio et al. supra note 117, at 4.
151. See Sawyer et al., supra note 91.
152. Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., Age and the Distribution of Crime, 94 AM. J. SOCIO. 803, 816
(1989).
153. 2019 Crime in the United States, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.2019/topic-pages/tables/table-38 [https://perma.cc/8UAQ-R8UF] (last visited May 13, 2022).
154. Id.
155. Age and Sex, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?t=Age%20and%20Sex
&g=0100000US_0400000US23&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S0101 [https://perma.cc/YH6D-H2XN] (last
visited May 13, 2022).
156. FBI, supra note 153.
157. ME. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 2019 CRIMES IN MAINE ANNUAL REPORT 31, https://www.maine.
gov/dps/msp/sites/maine.gov.dps.msp/files/inline-files/Crime%20in%20Maine%202019.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/N99L-PFZP].
158. Age and Sex, supra note 155.
159. See ME. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 157.
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achieve more just and effective outcomes. However, in Maine, as in most states, this
is not the case.
B. Maine’s Current Treatment of Emerging Adults
Knowing that science has consistently shown—and the Supreme Court has
recognized—that adolescents in their teenage years and into their early twenties
exhibit distinct neurobiological differences from adults, the question becomes: how
should the criminal legal system respond to these differences? Ideally, an
appropriate system of accountability recognizes the struggles of young people in
regulating behavior and provides opportunities for adolescents to learn and grow
from the poor decisions they make. To a certain degree, Maine recognizes, as do
other states, that age eighteen is not a magic number denoting adulthood. In fact, an
individual in Maine must be twenty-one to purchase tobacco products,160 purchase
and consume alcohol,161 foster or adopt a child,162 gamble at casinos,163 purchase
marijuana,164 and carry a concealed firearm without a permit.165
Although science suggests individuals are still developing through the age of
twenty-five, young offenders are frequently separated into two distinct categories at
the time of offense: youth under the age of eighteen, and emerging adults aged
eighteen to twenty-five.166 The conduct of the former is governed by a specialized
statutory process that treats young people differently than developmentally mature
adults.167 One exception to this principle is that Maine law allows for extended
juvenile court jurisdiction, meaning that if there is no new criminal conduct after age
eighteen, a youth who is adjudicated delinquent for a crime committed while under
age eighteen can remain under the supervision of the juvenile system up until age
twenty-one.168
Maine’s system for holding youth under age eighteen accountable for their
actions is governed by Maine’s Juvenile Code.169 Maine’s Juvenile Code sets forth
various procedures for adjudication of youth who have been charged with crimes and
serves a very different purpose than Maine’s Criminal Code, which seeks primarily

160. 22 M.R.S. § 1555-B(2) (2021).
161. 28-A M.R.S. §§ 2(20), 2051 (2021).
162. Maine Adoption and Foster Care Guidelines, ADOPT US KIDS, https://www.adoptuskids.org/
adoption-and-foster-care/how-to-adopt-and-foster/state-information/maine [https://perma.cc/TQV4-6B
GT] (last visited May 13, 2022).
163. 8 M.R.S. § 1031(1) (2021).
164. 28-B M.R.S. § 504(4) (2021).
165. 25 M.R.S. § 2001-A(2)(A-1) (2021).
166. See Age Matrix, supra note 116 (indicating that each state has an age of majority which serves as
the cut off for a young person’s ability to access resources in the juvenile system).
167. See generally Joseph E. Brennan, The Maine Juvenile Code, ALERT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
ATT’Y GEN. OF ME. (Oct. 26, 1978), [https://perma.cc/24VY-CD47] (explaining the reasoning behind the
implementation of Maine’s juvenile code which includes individualized treatment of young offenders
separate from the adult system).
168. 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A) (2021).
169. Id. § 3001-3507.
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to punish adults for their conduct and to deter others from engaging in the same.170
The purposes of the Maine Juvenile Code include:
(A) [t]o secure for each juvenile subject to these provisions such care and guidance,
preferably in the juvenile’s own home, as will best serve the juvenile’s welfare and
the interests of society;
(B) [t]o preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible, including
improvement of home environment;
(C) [t]o remove a juvenile from the custody of the juvenile’s parents only when the
juvenile’s welfare and safety or the protection of the public would otherwise be
endangered or, when necessary, to punish a child adjudicated, pursuant to chapter
507, as having committed a juvenile crime;
(D) [t]o secure for any juvenile removed from the custody of the juvenile’s parents
the necessary treatment, care, guidance and discipline to assist that juvenile in
becoming a responsible and productive member of society;
(E) [t]o provide procedures through which the provisions of the law are executed
and enforced and that ensure that the parties receive fair hearings at which their
rights as citizens are recognized and protected; and
(F) [t]o provide consequences, which may include those of a punitive nature, for
repeated serious criminal behavior or repeated violations of probation conditions.171

As previously mentioned, this special subset of statutes only applies to
individuals who are eighteen years of age and younger.172
Maine’s system of juvenile justice properly focuses on providing a rehabilitative
response to criminal behavior rather than a punitive one.173 This process for those
offenders under eighteen begins with law enforcement contact.174 If the officer
decides to summons the youth for the offense, then the case is referred to a Juvenile
Community Corrections Officer (JCCO) who conducts their own investigation into
the facts of the case and decides whether no further action is needed, an informal
adjustment is appropriate, or whether a juvenile petition should be filed with the
court.175 The discretion that a JCCO has to recommend a case to the prosecution or
dispose of it in some alternative way is a distinct feature of Maine’s Juvenile Code
that responds in a developmentally appropriate way to the actions of an adolescent.
It gives the JCCO an opportunity to inquire into the true culpability of the adolescent
170. Compare 15 M.R.S. § 3002(1) (expressly stating the rehabilitative purposes of Maine’s juvenile
code), with Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376, 377 (Me. 1990) (noting that a statute is criminal in nature if
it serves and promotes the traditional aims of punishment—deterrence and retribution).
171. 15 M.R.S. § 3002(1)(A)-(F) (2021).
172. Id. § 3003(2) (“‘Adult’ means a person eighteen years of age or older.”).
173. There are, understandably, advocates who stress that Maine’s system of juvenile justice as it is
currently structured does not adequately serve youth under the age of eighteen. See The Problem, ME.
YOUTH JUST., https://www.maineyouthjustice.org/the-problem/ [https://perma.cc/C8ZZ-EEDD] (last
visited May 13, 2022); The Editorial Board, Our View: It’s Beyond Question – Justice System Fails Kids,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (June 17, 2008), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/06/17/our-view-itsbeyond-question-justice-system-fails-kids/ [https://perma.cc/6EDP-9VGJ].
174. What Happens in a Juvenile Case, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine.gov/
courts/juvenile/happens.html [https://perma.cc/CYS2-6SCL] (last visited May 13, 2022).
175. Id.
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and ascertain whether the actions taken represent irreparable corruption, or if instead,
the young person requires developmentally appropriate intervention to limit the
chances of any repeat behavior.
If the JCCO opts for an informal adjustment, they have the authority to require
the youth to: (i) engage in community service, (ii) compensate the victim if they
incurred financial harm, (iii) attend school or work, (iv) obey a curfew and abstain
from interacting with certain individuals, (v) partake in a restorative justice process,
(vi) and/or receive counseling and other therapeutic services.176 Even if an informal
adjustment is not sought, the JCCO and the Assistant District Attorney (ADA)
oftentimes work together to reach a resolution that does not result in the detention of
youth.177
These resolutions often take the form of deferred dispositions that, if
successfully completed, do not result in an adolescent returning to court.178 On
occasion, if alternative pathways fail, a criminally accused youth may proceed to an
adjudicatory hearing and may face a period of detention in a juvenile facility.179
Importantly, the alternative ways that resolve a youth’s case and cater to the
unique neurological differences of youth do not exist for emerging adults over the
age of eighteen. As soon as a young person reaches their eighteenth birthday, they
are no longer eligible for an informal adjustment or any other alternative resolution
because they now fall under the jurisdiction of Maine’s Criminal Code.180 While this
categorical exclusion from developmentally appropriate resolutions is common in
most states, it is not supported by the science of adolescent development. As Susan
Sawyer noted in The Age of Adolescence, the imbalanced development of the
adolescent brain—and the associated risk-taking behaviors—continue well into a
person’s mid-twenties.181
If an individual commits an offense considered to be a crime after their
eighteenth birthday, the process they encounter is starkly different. After the
criminal conduct occurs, the youth is either arrested or summonsed and then a local
District Attorney’s Office decides whether to prosecute the crime without any
particular or required consideration as to the offender’s individual characteristics.182
If they do prosecute, then the case proceeds to court and the young person must either
vigorously defend their case, work out some deferred disposition agreement, plead
guilty, or exercise their right to trial.183 Absent any conduct, circumstances, or
characteristics which qualify the youth for one of Maine’s specialized treatment

176. Id.
177. See id. (discussing the expansive ways in which a JCCO may be involved in the resolution of a
young person’s case).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See 15 M.R.S. § 3003(2) (2021).
181. See Sawyer et al., supra note 91.
182. See What Happens if I am Charged with a Crime in Maine? Can I get a Lawyer?, PINE TREE
LEGAL ASSISTANCE, https://www.ptla.org/what-happens-if-i-am-charged-crime-maine-can-i-get-lawyer
[https://perma.cc/A7KU-LB5M] (last visited May 13, 2022).
183. See id.
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courts,184 there exists no state-mandated alternative pathway toward achieving an
alternative, non-carceral resolution of the youth’s case.185 There is no JCCO, no
informal adjustments, and no viable alternatives available to respond to the needs of
the developing brain. This lack of viable alternatives leads to higher recidivism rates
and forecloses the opportunity for emerging adults to receive developmentally
appropriate treatment that is responsive to their unique neurological and
developmental needs.
In order to respond to the needs of emerging adults in evidence and sciencebased ways that meet public safety goals, policy makers in Maine should look for
alternatives which provide the unique, developmentally appropriate protections
offered by Maine’s Juvenile Code to emerging adults.
C. Science-Based, Developmentally-Appropriate Characteristics of Effective
Emerging Adult Policy
With the understanding that Maine’s system falls short of adequately addressing
young people in the eighteen to twenty-five-year-old age group, the next inquiry
must be, what type of policy shifts would appropriately serve these young people?
In other words, what does a policy approach that accurately reflects and implements
the most current science concerning treatment of adolescents who are eighteen to
twenty-five years old actually look like?
The Section below discusses the benefits and drawbacks of certain frameworks
for responding to emerging adults. Regardless of the framework chosen, an
emerging adult policy must be anchored by the following four principles: (i)
individualized response; (ii) specialized case managers; (iii) consideration of
developmental maturity in disposition and sentencing; and (iv) post-program
confidentiality.
1. Individualized Response
The first guiding principle of individualized response recognizes that each
emerging adult that encounters law enforcement has their own individual needs, and
that “interventions should be equally accessible and specific to all socio-economic
levels, cultures, jurisdictions, sexual orientation, and ethnic groups.”186 As discussed

184. Treatment Courts, STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine.gov/courts/treatment/
index.html [https://perma.cc/398K-LG4J] (last visited May 13, 2022). Maine has four treatment courts
where those charged with crimes may seek treatment: Adult Drug Treatment Court, Co-Occurring
Disorders Court, Family Recovery Court, and Veterans Treatment Court. Id.
185. See infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text for a brief discussion about an independent project
to divert emerging adults charged with first offense misdemeanors. This program has been in existence
for about twenty-four months in Cumberland County. See Restorative Justice, CUMBERLAND CNTY,
https://www.cumberlandcounty.org/726/Restorative-Justice
[https://perma.cc/G4M8-DEZW]
(last
visited May 13, 2022).
186. AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS’N, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMS WORKING WITH
YOUTH INVOLVED IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2020).
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above, each emerging adult is also likely to be at different stages of their
development, and they will therefore require different developmental supports.187
If the legal community accepts—and the scientific community supports—the
notion that each emerging adult is their own person possessing their own individual
needs, then any approach designed to enhance outcomes for their age group will be
unable to offer blanket treatments and programming that will sufficiently serve them
all. Rather, quality policy must consider the individualized circumstances of each
emerging adult and be able to tailor services and restrictions to best suit their needs.
In Maine, one small example of an antithetical approach is pre-trial bail
conditions, which operate as a pretrial probation.188 At their initial appearance,
virtually all offenders (violent or not) are placed on court ordered bail that includes
certain conditions the accused adults must follow.189 Failure to follow these
conditions can result in revocation of bail and further criminal charges.190 These
conditions have, for the most part, been standardized pursuant to the statutorily
authorized conditions found in the Maine Criminal Code.191 Thus, when either an
eighteen year old, or a sixty-seven year old, comes before the Court on a summons
from a local officer, they can each expect to generally be placed on the same set of
standard conditions.
The problem with this approach is that following the conditions—and
understanding the consequences for failing to follow them—may be easier for a fully
mature adult than for an emerging adult. If a still-developing eighteen-year-old with
hyperactive reward circuitry uses the same substance as a sixty-seven-year-old—
both in violation of their probationary conditions—then under the current system,
they face the same punishment. After incurring a violation of conditions charge, they
would also likely face additional drug charges.
An individually-responsive, scientifically-principled systemic response would
recognize the developmental differences between the eighteen and sixty-seven year
old, and curtail bail conditions or consequences for violations to better fit the youth’s
needs.
The eighteen-year-old’s conditions could provide for graduated
consequences other than additional criminal charges in an effort to avoid further
system involvement and recidivism. If the young person is homeless, the conditions
could require appointments with local housing authorities or agencies, and if they

187. For example, one young adult may have a nearly fully developed emotional regulatory circuit but
may be more prone to participation in reward-seeking behaviors, failing to recognize the consequences of
their conduct. See Luna et al., supra note 137. Therefore, this young person may require different services
than their peers who may possess a severely underdeveloped emotional regulatory circuit. Id.
188. Adult Community Corrections, ME. DEP’T OF CORRS., https://www.maine.gov/corrections/adultcommunity-corrections [https://perma.cc/XF8C-34CQ] (last visited May 13, 2022).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 17-A M.R.S. § 1807(2)(N) (2021). While this provision grants a court broad discretion to impose
“any conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the person or the public safety or security,” id.,
such discretion is rarely exercised by the court. See Understanding Bail in Criminal Cases, ME. CRIM.
DEF. GRP., https://www.notguiltyattorneys.com/understanding-bail-in-criminal-cases/ [https://perma.cc/
D58G-VXAR] (last visited May 13, 2022). A bail condition form generally contains a number of standard
boxes to be checked which prohibit the use of drugs or alcohol, require a payment of bail, mandate regular
testing for use of substances, and require some sort of participation in work or school. See State of Maine
Probation Conditions Form (on file with author).
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are not attending school or working, the conditions could require contact with one of
the many Maine-based organizations that offer help in these areas.192 Rather than
forcing the fundamentally different and unique class of young people known as
emerging adults to comply with the blanket requirements imposed on adults, the
conditions mandated could be used as a tool to aid the eighteen-year-old in achieving
a positive outcome. Individualized conditions could help limit recidivism and further
healthy, appropriate development. Taking an individualized approach in response to
an emerging adult’s behavior is an important step in shifting the narrative
surrounding crime within the emerging adult population. This approach recognizes
that young adults who engage in criminal behavior often have underlying conditions,
such as mental health issues or other traumas. Such an approach creates a unique
opportunity for a system of justice—it can respond to every need a young person has,
not just those that are legal in nature.
The ability to adequately respond to the individualized needs of emerging adult
offenders must be a tenet of any policy approach designed to better serve them.
Realistic, youth-centered expectations would go a long way towards enhancing
outcomes and decreasing the system involvement within Maine’s emerging adult
population.
2. Specialized Case Managers
A second tenet of any policy-based approach to enhancing outcomes for
emerging adults is the creation of specialized case management positions—
preferably not within the department of corrections193—that are assigned to manage
an emerging adult’s case.194 While the benefits of having a JCCO would extend to
youth covered by a raised jurisdictional age, the functional equivalent should be
developed in the emerging adult context as well. Someone able to facilitate and
coordinate the criminal legal system’s response to emerging adults is a pivotal
component of effective policy. These specialized workers who would be employed
to specifically serve emerging adults would be a crucial tool in building an
individually-responsive system that identifies and addresses the unique social,
emotional, behavioral, and mental health needs of emerging adults.
When law enforcement makes a referral to a JCCO, the JCCO can ask the
prosecutor to decline taking any action against the juvenile, reach an agreement for
an informal adjustment with the youth and their familial/community supports, or ask
the prosecutor to petition the case to court.195 Even after petitioning the case, the

192. See, e.g., Regional Care Teams, PLACE MATTERS, https://placemattersmaine.org/regional-careteams/ [https://perma.cc/3SX2-FNG5] (last visited Mar. 17, 2022).
193. See CTR. FOR CHILD.’S L. & POL’Y, ME. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT 130 (2020).
194. While research is scarce regarding the benefits, many states have housed juvenile justice services
outside of the department of corrections and found that facilitating supervision of criminally accused
youth within a more service-oriented agency allows access to funding streams that may not be available
to more punitive departments like corrections. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Services, N.H. DEP’T. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/djjs/index.htm [https://perma.cc/BEB6-2MKM] (last
visited Feb. 25, 2021); Services for Youth, AGENCY OF HUM. SERVS., DEP’T. FOR CHILD. & FAMS.,
https://dcf.vermont.gov/youth/justice [https://perma.cc/FS65-AVX6] (last visited May 13, 2022).
195. See STATE OF ME. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 174.
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JCCO can play a role in its resolution by staying in touch with the youth and acting
as a resource for them as needs arise.196
However, for people in Maine between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five,
there is no JCCO equivalent; instead, there is a summons, a court date, a prosecutor,
and a judge.197 There is no early intervention or any sort of specialized job training
in what these young people require. While eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old youth
may be served by a JCCO, if the juvenile court’s age of jurisdiction is raised, or if a
young person is committed until the age of twenty-one, this still leaves those ages
twenty-one to twenty-five without crucial support needed to successfully navigating
the system. This role of the specialized worker is vital because they can identify and
respond to unique developmental needs in a holistic manner.198
3. Consideration of Developmental Immaturity in Disposition and Sentencing
Absent a plea deal or deferred disposition, emerging adults who engage in
criminal conduct in Maine are subject to the same dispositional procedures as adults
and are sentenced according to Maine’s Criminal Code.199 When imposing a
sentence on an emerging adult convicted of a crime, the court considers three factors
as part of a process termed a “Hewey” analysis.200 First, the court shall “determine
a basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of
the offense as committed by the individual.”201 Second, the court must “determine
the maximum term of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant
sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case.”202
Relevant sentencing factors “include, but are not limited to, the character of the
individual, the individual’s criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim
and the protection of the public interest.”203 Finally, the Court will “determine what
portion, if any, of the maximum term of imprisonment . . . should be suspended and,
196. See id.
197. While many youth in Maine receive case management services from various providers, there are
often barriers to accessing these services. For instance, most case management service providers require
clients to meet certain criteria such as being diagnosed with a behavioral or intellectual disability. See
Case Management, ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/oads/getsupport/adults-intellectual-disability-and-autism/case-management
[https://perma.cc/4MMU-PN9K]
(last visited May 13, 2022). The creation of specialized case worker positions to provide resources to
emerging adults involved in the system would provide access to services regardless of clinical condition.
198. Examples include targeted substance abuse counseling for youth with a diagnosed substance use
disorder, intensive counseling for youth with significant trauma, and reproductive health services for
youth who are sexually active. See Transition Planning with Youth: A Checklist for Community
Reintegration, UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF L., https://mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/clinics-and-centers/
maine-center-juvenile-policy-law/ [https://perma.cc/2ZST-EKJP] (last visited May 13, 2022).
199. 17-A M.R.S. § 1502(1) (2021).
200. See Matthew E. Lane, Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application
of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs, 60 ME. L. REV. 587, 591-92
(2008); State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993) (“[W]e use this opportunity for clarification . . .
[and] to define each of the three steps we deem necessary to be followed by the trial court to achieve a
greater uniformity in the sentencing process . . . .”).
201. 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(A) (2021). Notably, this factor is to be considered in an objective manner,
without regard to the circumstances of the offender. State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991).
202. 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) (2021).
203. Id.
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if a suspension order is to be entered, determine the appropriate period of probation
or administrative release to accompany that suspension.”204
Effective emerging adult policy allows for the developmental immaturity of the
emerging adult to be considered in the sentencing or dispositional process.205 The
age of the offender is paramount because the culpability of the emerging adult is
inherently less than that of the developmentally mature adult.206 With an
underdeveloped emotional regulatory circuit, heightened reward-seeking tendencies,
and the influence of peers, a sentencing scheme which ignores the reality of an
emerging adult’s diminished culpability is problematic and misguided.207 Thus, any
effective dispositional mechanism must be anchored in its commitment to
considering the developmental maturity of participants at every stage in the
process.208
4. Increased Confidentiality
It is no secret that criminal records present a serious barrier to successful
reintegration for system-involved young people.209 Any step towards societal
reintegration that a former, or current, system-involved young person takes is often
stymied by the existence of a criminal history. 210 Applying for a job, entering the
military, obtaining post-secondary education, and securing housing are just a few of
the tasks made more difficult by the existence of a criminal record.211
The principal justification for sealing juvenile records is that crimes committed
by people when they were children should not inhibit their success as adults.
Proponents of automatic or other sealing and expungement provisions often cite the
diminished culpability of youth as a primary reason for reform enacting
legislation.212 Because the neurobiological differences which provide support for
sealing the juvenile records of those under eighteen are also present in those aged
eighteen to twenty-five, the rationale for confidentiality of records extends to this
age group as well.
Any policy change aimed at enhancing outcomes for emerging adults must
include a mechanism for minimizing the collateral consequences of a criminal
record. To truly advance and promote better outcomes for adults eighteen to twenty-

204. Id. § 1602(1)(C) (2021).
205. See generally HOWARD LEAGUE FOR PENAL REFORM, SENTENCING YOUNG ADULTS: MAKING
THE CASE FOR SENTENCING PRINCIPLES FOR YOUNG ADULTS 3 (2018).
206. Id. See also Sawyer et al., supra note 91; Mercurio supra note 117.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See generally SUSAN HAWES ET AL., UNSEALED FATE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDING OF JUVENILE RECORDS IN MAINE (Univ. of S. Me. Muskie Sch. of Pub.
Serv. eds., 2017).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Judith G. McMullen, Invisible Stripes: The Problem of Youth Criminal Records, 27 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 38-40 (2018); see also Automatically Sealing or Expunging Juvenile
Records, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/automatically-sealing-or-expunging-juvenile-records.aspx [https://perma.cc/S65Z-WG
2A] (last visited May 13, 2022).
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five years old, it is imperative that emerging adults be freed from the collateral
consequences of their youthful indiscretions.
III. MAKING IT RIGHT IN MAINE: LOCAL CHANGES IN LEGISLATION AND POLICY
A. Recent Efforts and a Path Forward
The 130th Maine Legislature introduced a number of proposals designed to
recognize and respond to scientific advances in understanding the development of
youth.213 One such effort aimed to prevent very young children from entering the
delinquency system.214 The youth-centered package of legislation also included a
housing bill that sought to improve the community reintegration process for youth.215
Unfortunately, this legislation did not make it out of the Committee on Health and
Human Services; it was voted “Ought Not To Pass” on May 19, 2021.216 Another
piece of legislation attempted to take initial steps toward recognition of a young adult
offender category.217 This bill defined a “young adult” as a person between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-five and would have provided young adults with options to
avoid justice system involvement.218 The bill passed both the House and Senate but
it was vetoed by Governor Mills.219
Despite the Governor’s misgivings about diversion for emerging adults, a
diversion program for emerging adults was established on a county-wide basis in
2020.220 The Restorative Justice Institute of Maine came to a cooperative agreement
with the Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office to divert some misdemeanor
offenses for certain emerging adults.221 Within its first year, the Young Adult
Diversion Program (“YADP”), allowed for the diversion of forty-nine youth.222
YADP permitted these youth to avoid the adult system, bail, potential convictions,
and ensuing collateral consequences by offering them an opportunity to complete a
restorative justice program.223 Once the youth completed this restorative justice
component, the District Attorney’s Office declined prosecution on any charges
related to the YADP participant.224 This is a promising program, but because it is
currently financed by a combination of foundation money and support from
individual prosecutors’ offices without statutory backing, it could cease to exist

213. See, e.g., Maine Juvenile Justice Legislative Update 2021, UNIV. OF ME. SCH. OF L.,
https://mainelaw.maine.edu/academics/clinics-and-centers/maine-center-juvenile-policy-law/ [https://per
ma.cc/UF43-RUKE] (last visited May 13, 2022).
214. L.D. 320, §§ 2, 11 (130th Legis. 2021).
215. See L.D. 843 (130th Legis. 2021).
216. Id.
217. L.D. 847 (130th Legis. 2021).
218. Id.
219. Letter from Governor Janet T. Mills to the 130th Legislature of the State of Maine (June 23, 2021).
220. Young Adult Diversion Program, RESTORATIVE JUST. INST. OF ME., https://www.rjimaine.org/
young-adults [https://perma.cc/J4HX-75L3] (last visited May 13, 2022).
221. Id.
222. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE INSTITUTE OF MAINE, YOUNG ADULT DIVERSION PROGRAM ANNUAL
EVALUATION 10/1/2020 – 9/30/2021 1 (2021).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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should the resources funding the program be depleted.225 Further, the prosecutors
control the selection process,226 which creates the risk of bias influencing decisions
about which emerging adults are given this opportunity.
Additionally, the Maine Legislature previously attempted to help mitigate both
direct and collateral consequences. In 2015, Maine enacted a law that allowed some
relief from certain convictions for a brief period of time.227 The law contained a
narrow category of eligible crimes228 and eligible youth,229 and the relief was very
burdensome to obtain.230 This law remained in force for four years until its sunset
provision became effective, ending any statutory relief for emerging adult
offenders.231
Other legislation borne of a year-long assessment of Maine’s juvenile system
continued to reinforce a more rehabilitative, less carceral approach to youth and
young adults in general.232 An Act to Implement the Recommendations of the Maine
Juvenile Justice System Assessment and Reinvestment Task Force provided
guideposts for the eventual closure of the state’s remaining youth prison and the
transition to smaller, more therapeutic secure placements for youth committed to the
Maine Department of Corrections.233
In light of these recent efforts, now is the time for Maine to implement more
focused policy initiatives designed to rehabilitate, not punish, emerging adults that
come in contact with the criminal legal system. Based on the analysis above, Maine
should raise the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction to age twenty-one and
enact laws that shield emerging adults ages twenty-one to twenty-five from the most
punitive sanctions of Maine’s Criminal Code.
B. Raising the Age
To raise the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction, Maine must amend its
juvenile code to allow any young adult age twenty-one or under who commits a
crime to remain under the authority of the juvenile court.234 Correspondingly,

225. Id. at 8.
226. See Letter from District Attorney Jonathan Sahrbeck to Defense Counsel with attached Legal
Memo from Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office to Defense Counsel and Interested Parties,
March 27, 2021.
227. 15 M.R.S. §§ 2251-2258 (2015).
228. 15 M.R.S. § 2251(6) (2015) repealed pursuant to its own terms by P.L. 2015, ch. 354, § 1
(effective Oct. 1, 2019).
229. 15 M.R.S. § 2252(2) (2015) repealed pursuant to its own terms by P.L. 2015, ch. 354, § 1
(effective Oct. 1, 2019).
230. See 15 M.R.S. § 2252(3)-(6) (2015) repealed pursuant to its own terms by P.L. 2015, ch. 354, §
1 (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
231. 15 M.R.S. § 2259 (2015) repealed pursuant to its own terms by P.L. 2015, ch. 354, § 1 (effective
Oct. 1, 2019).
232. L.D. 320, §§ 2, 11 (130th Legis. 2021); L.D. 546 (130th Legis. 2021); L.D. 1668 (130th Legis.
2021); see also CTR. FOR CHILD.’S L. & POL’Y ET. AL, MAINE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
(2020).
233. L.D. 546 (130th Legis. 2021).
234. This will make the definition of “juvenile” in Chapter 15 consistent with the definition of “child”
in 22 M.R.S. § 4099-I(1)(B) (2021). Currently, “Juvenile Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over
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indeterminate commitments will need to be increased from age twenty-one to age
twenty-five.235 The current statute allows for juvenile probation to continue past the
age of twenty-one,236 and therefore it would not need to be amended except to cap it
at twenty-five.
1. A Look at Other States, Lessons Learned, and Progress Made
In the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state approved laws making it easier to
remove children and youth from juvenile court jurisdiction, exposing them to adult
court jurisdiction.237 Throughout the 1990s the tough on crime, “adult crime adult
time” rhetoric, fueled by false predictions of a coming wave of youthful
“superpredators” and sensationalized and racially-coded media reports of serious
crimes committed by juvenile offenders, dominated the policy conversation.238 But
by the early 2000s, the superpredator myth had been debunked,239 juvenile crime
continued to decline,240 and the growing body of adolescent development research,
including a better understanding of brain development, began to shift the
conversation back toward more data-informed policies and practices.241 For
example, in 2007, there were fourteen states that excluded sixteen- or seventeenyear-olds from the juvenile justice system solely because of their age.242 Successful
advocacy efforts across the country to reverse these policies and bring more youth
under juvenile jurisdiction has resulted in 80% fewer youth charged as adults in the
U.S., down from a height of an estimated 250,000 in the early 2000s to just 53,000
in 2019.243 By 2020, only three states—Georgia, Texas, and Wisconsin—continued
to exclude seventeen year-olds from juvenile court jurisdiction, establishing a

proceedings in which an adult is alleged to have committed a juvenile crime before attaining 18 years of
age.” 15 M.R.S. § 3101(2)(D) (2021).
235. See 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A).
236. Id. § 3314-A.
237. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. DELINQ. AND PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 8 (2011), https://www.ojp.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLB8-WK3M].
238. Carroll Bogert & Lynnell Hancock, Superpredator: The Media Myth that Demonized a
Generation of Black Youth, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/20/
superpredator-the-media-myth-that-demonized-a-generation-of-black-youth [https://perma.cc/ZZ2A-8A
T8] (last visited May 13, 2022).
239. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-superpredatorsbush-aide-has-regrets.html [https://perma.cc/T6GT-Y5TG].
240. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. DELINQ. AND PREVENTION, THE DECLINE IN
ARRESTS OF JUVENILES CONTINUED THROUGH 2019 1 (2020).
241. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH
(Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013).
242. JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, RAISING THE BAR: STATE TRENDS IN KEEPING
YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015-2017) 8 (2017).
243. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., YOUTH YOUNGER THAN 18
PROSECUTED IN CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL ESTIMATE, 2019 CASES 2 (2021), http://ncjj.org/pdf/
NCJJ_Transfer_estimate_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSY8-LHMU].
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national standard of age eighteen as the minimum age of adult criminal
responsibility.244
Several state legislatures have also begun to look at raising the age of original
juvenile court jurisdiction further. A majority of states already have extended
original juvenile court jurisdiction, meaning that youth adjudicated in juvenile or
family court can remain under juvenile jurisdiction up to age twenty-one and, in
some states, up to ages twenty-four or twenty-five to complete juvenile dispositions,
sanctions, and services, encompassing offense and consent requirements.245 Raising
the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction allows older youth and emerging adults
to automatically be processed under juvenile or family court jurisdiction, where there
is a more rehabilitative approach and frequently more alternative services and
support available.
In 2015, Connecticut Governor Daniel Malloy became the first governor to
propose raising the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction above age eighteen and
eventually proposed legislation that would gradually incorporate eighteen, nineteen,
and twenty year-olds into the juvenile justice system over a three-year period.246
Since then, several states including California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Nebraska have looked at raising the age of original juvenile court
jurisdiction to eighteen years and above.247 In 2018, Vermont became the first state
to pass legislation raising the age of original juvenile court jurisdiction beyond age
seventeen, mandating that eighteen-year-olds be included in the family court system
beginning on July 1, 2020, nineteen-year-olds on July 1, 2022, and twenty-year-olds
beginning in 2024.248 Those accused of twelve specified felonies known collectively
as “5204” felonies were excluded from this shift in jurisdiction and continued to be
handled in adult court.249
2. Benefits vs. Costs
Raise-the-age reforms are not only a reflection of the science that suggests
emerging adults are developmentally more like teens than older adults—and
therefore should elicit a like response from the criminal legal system—but are also
an acknowledgement that processing emerging adults in the adult system fails to

244. BRIAN EVANS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., WINNING THE CAMPAIGN: STATE TRENDS IN
FIGHTING THE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN AS ADULTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2020).
245. Jurisdictional Boundaries, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY, POL’Y, PRAC. & STAT., http://www.jjgps.org/
jurisdictional-boundaries#delinquency-age-boundaries [https://perma.cc/2SSY-59M4] (last visited Feb.
25, 2022).
246. Press Release, Governor Daniel P. Malloy, Gov. Malloy Introduces Juvenile Justice Reform
Legislation: Legislative Proposal Raises the Age of Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction; Expands Opportunity
for Youthful Offenders to Lead Productive Lives (Mar. 20, 2018), https://portal.ct.gov/Malloy-Archive/
Press-Room/Press-Releases/2018/03-2018/Gov-Malloy-Introduces-Juvenile-Justice-Reform-Legislation
[https://perma.cc/38CD-WQJM]; see German Lopez, Connecticut’s Governor Wants to Try 19- and 20Year Olds as Minors. Why It’s a Great Idea, VOX (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/11/6/9684
148/juvenile-justice-age [https://perma.cc/8GX7-RBNJ].
247. BARKIN, supra note 141.
248. Katie Dodds, Why All States Should Embrace Vermont’s Raise the Age Initiative, COALITION FOR
JUV. JUST. (July 20, 2020), https://www.juvjustice.org/blog/1174 [https://perma.cc/GLE4-B45H].
249. 33 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5204 (West 2021).
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meet public safety goals, causes undo harm to the individual young adult, and often
fails to satisfy the victim.
Research on recidivism rates that compares youth handled in the adult system to
those retained in the juvenile system finds that those processed as adults were 34%
more likely to be re-arrested—and for more violent crimes—than those who
remained under juvenile or family court jurisdiction.250 Another national study of
thirty-four states including Maine reveals that 71% of system-involved young adults
aged eighteen- to twenty-four years old released in 2012 were re-arrested within five
years.251 Similarly, these same characteristics of adolescence and young adult brains
suggest that the threat of processing youth in the adult system also fails as a
deterrent.252 As discussed in the earlier Sections on adolescent development and
recent Supreme Court rulings, youthful offenders are fundamentally different than
adults. Given the research on brain science, that distinction does not end at age
seventeen, but rather extends into an individual’s mid-twenties, especially as it
relates to decision-making in highly emotional or high-risk, high-reward
situations.253 It then stands to reason that the adult system will be less effective in
achieving public safety goals of deterrence and reduced recidivism with respect to
emerging adults and, given the added legal responsibilities that come with attaining
age eighteen, may actually do more harm than good.
The problem of using 18 as a stark demarcation of the “transition” between
childhood and adulthood is that the criminal justice system could, unintentionally,
be making this natural maturing process worse rather than better: Emerging adults
are “branded” as criminal and are weighed down with a criminal conviction that will
follow them throughout the rest of their adult lives, affecting their employment,
housing and educational opportunities. The juvenile justice system, on the other
hand, holds the individual accountable but provides developmentally appropriate
services and allows the individual to exit the system without a public
“conviction.”254

In addition to the significant barriers individual emerging adults face following
a criminal conviction, the older youth and young adult population is also
characterized by: (i) high rates of mental health and substance use issues,255 (ii)
limited education and job skills,256 (iii) prior involvement in the child welfare
250. CDC, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH
ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON COMMUNITY PREVENTIVE SERVICES, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, 6
(2007).
251. MATTHEW DUROSE & LEONARDO ANTENANGELLI, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 34
STATES IN 2012: A 5-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2012–2017) 1, 22 (Dept. of Just. ed., 2021).
252. Jill M. Ward, Deterrence’s Difficulty Magnified: The Importance of Adolescent Development in
Assessing Deterrence Value of Transferring Juveniles to Adult Court, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y,
253, 260-63 (2003).
253. BARKIN, supra note 141.
254. CHESTER, supra note 1.
255. See Intersection Between Mental Health and the Juvenile Justice System, LITERATURE REVIEW:
OJJDP (July 2017), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/model-programs-guide/literature-reviews/intsection_between_
mental_health_and_the_juvenile_justice_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JF2-Y9CG].
256. See Locked Out: Improving Educational and Vocational Outcomes for Incarcerated Youth,
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (Nov. 2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
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system,257 and (iv) homelessness and unemployment.258 There is also the larger
taxpayer cost in terms of incarceration259 that is further compounded by recidivism
data that shows that these young adults are likely to return more frequently and for
more serious crimes after their initial involvement in the adult criminal system.260
Giving these emerging adults access to supports and services more commonly
provided in the juvenile justice system would help meet their needs and better
support their successful transition into adulthood with a lower long-term public cost.
Recent evidence also suggests that victims of crime are increasingly dissatisfied
with the criminal justice system’s ability to make them feel safe and to hold those
that caused harm accountable in ways that are meaningful and prevents future
harm.261 A 2016 national survey on victims’ views found that the vast majority of
crime victims believe that the criminal legal system relies too heavily on punitive
responses to crime and they overwhelmingly prefer that systems invest in prevention
and treatment over incarceration.262 Raising the age of original juvenile jurisdiction
would give emerging adults who come in contact with the criminal legal system
greater access to more rehabilitative responses, like the diversion and restorative
programs envisioned in L.D. 847, that are in line with the desires of those most
impacted by the harm caused.263 Finally, it is worth noting that the U.S. Department
of Justice and a wide array of criminal justice organizations and stakeholders,

2020/01/LOCKED_OUT_Improving_Educational_and_Vocational_Outcomes_for_Incarcerated_
Youth.pdf [https://perma.cc/27UV-WEJ3].
257. See Dual System Youth: At the Intersection of Child Maltreatment and Delinquency, NIJ (Aug.
10, 2021), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/dual-system-youth-intersection-child-maltreatment-anddelinquency [https://perma.cc/S6ND-QTDR].
258. See Youth Homelessness and Juvenile Justice: Opportunities for Collaboration and Impact,
COALITION FOR JUV. JUST. (June 2016), https://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/pol
icy%20brief_FINAL.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8J6-YCSL]; Angela Carter, The Consequences
of Adolescent Delinquent Behavior for Adult Employment Outcomes. 48 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 17, 1729 (2019).
259. JUST. POL’Y INST., IMPROVING APPROACHES TO SERVING YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2016) https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/jpi_young_adults
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5ND-ZLCT]. Among a sampling of eight cities and counties, young adults
were 8.4% of the overall population, but were 25% of the jail population in these communities, 72% of
whom were young adults of color. Id. In these eight communities, taxpayers spend $163 a day to jail
someone (upwards of $58,000 per year). Id.
260. KAREN U. LINDELL & KATRINA L. GOODJOINT, RETHINKING JUSTICE FOR EMERGING ADULTS:
SPOTLIGHT ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION 11 (2020).
261. DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION AND THE ROAD TO
REPAIR 42-49 (The New Press ed., 2019).
262. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF
VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 13-21 (2016) (citing data that found victims of crime prefer
rehabilitation over punishment, prefer shorter sentences and more spending on prevention to longer
sentences and prefer spending more on education, jobs, and treatment than jails and prisons).
263. Id. at 216 (defines young adult as aged eighteen to twenty-five and requires that for certain
offenses that this population is provided “information on community-based programs or services that
address the daily living needs of a young adult, including but not limited to the need for housing assistance;
health care; behavioral health or substance use disorder assessment, treatment and services; restorative
justice; social services and mentoring; and employment services”)
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including a growing number of prosecutors, support efforts to include some
emerging adults in the juvenile system.264
Raising the age of jurisdiction in Maine would address the youngest of the
emerging adults but leave the twenty-one- to twenty-five-year-olds without a buffer
from our adult criminal system. In order to provide our most vulnerable youth a
better chance to successfully transition into their adult life, Maine must also provide
protection from a range of criminal sanctions.
C. Protecting the Youngest Adults from the Harshest Sanctions
The full range of criminal sanctions, from mandatory minimum fines to life
without parole applies not only to all youth from their eighteenth birthday forward,
but to every child bound-over from juvenile to criminal court. The 130th Maine
Legislature finally added a few minimal protections for the youngest of children
charged with juvenile crimes.265 Although a child of any age can still be charged
with committing a juvenile crime, if that child is under the age of twelve they cannot
be detained in a correctional facility for more than seven days without their
consent.266 Also, a child under the age of twelve cannot be committed to a DOC
facility.267 These new statutory protections limiting a judge’s ability to detain and
commit youth under twelve provide necessary and important safeguards for a limited
number of children each year. Maine needs meaningful protections for older youth,
who share more developmental affinity with children than adults.
The Maine Criminal Code is littered with minimum mandatory sentences and
fines, especially if the charges involve drugs or driving.268 In the sentencing
provision of the drug chapter, a judge may be able to make findings to alleviate the
harshest sentences.269 Alternatively, Maine’s Motor Vehicle Code offers no judicial
discretion to its minimum mandatory provisions, which requires a minimum
mandatory sentence of five years’ imprisonment for merely operating a motor
vehicle after certain prior convictions.270 Once a youth reaches their eighteenth
birthday or is bound-over to adult court, there are other statutory provisions that
enhance punishment outside of driving and drug charges.

264. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, YOUNG OFFENDERS: WHAT HAPPENS AND
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/242653.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHE36HA8]; FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2019),
https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FJP_Brief_YoungAdults.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SQ4R-UKPG].
265. See L.D. 320, §§ 2, 11 (130th Legis. 2021).
266. 15 M.R.S. § 3203-A(4)(G) (2021).
267. Id. § 3314(F) (2021).
268. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1125 (2021); 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A(2) (2021).
269. 17-A M.R.S. § 1125(2) (2021).
270. 29-A M.R.S. § 2558(2)(D) (2021). This mandatory minimum sentence must be issued if a person
operates a motor vehicle after three prior operating-after-revocation convictions or three prior operatingunder-the-influence convictions within the last ten years. Id. License revocation can occur without any
dangerous or impaired driving based on a history of driving offense convictions from any age. 29-A
M.R.S. § 2472 (2021). One example is operating without a driver’s license (OWL). 29-A M.R.S. § 1251
(2021). OWLs are statutorily excluded from the juvenile code, and it is an offense that leads to license
revocation. 15 M.R.S. § 3103(1)(A) (2021); see also 29-A M.R.S. §§ 2551-A(1)(A)(5), 2552 (2021).
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Prior criminal convictions result in misdemeanor conduct leading to felony
charges.271 The criminal code’s Theft by unauthorized taking or transfer statute
includes a laundry list of offenses that are used to elevate misdemeanor conduct to
felony indictments.272 This list includes shoplifting, writing a bad check, and
videotaping a film at a movie theater.273
Maine must revisit L.D. 847, using YADP’s initial success274 as support and
guidance, to allow emerging adults throughout the state access to the benefits of
restorative practices and, for those charged with first time misdemeanor offenses,
from obtaining criminal records or incurring crippling fines and fees. Moreover, any
criminal statute that gives a judge the power to deviate from a minimum mandatory
sentence needs to have the addition of “emerging adult” as a specific reason not to
impose the minimum mandatory fine, jail, or prison sentence.
Driving charges have become some of Maine’s most punitive offenses.275 Many
Class D and E criminal offenses that are driving-related are specifically exempted
from the Juvenile Code. For example, if a youth has a car accident and is charged
with driving to endanger276 and possession of alcohol by a minor,277 that youth will
be subjected to prosecution in both the adult criminal system and the juvenile
system.278 Even though the charges arose out of the same incident, the youth will
have separate court dates, different standards, and no confidentiality for the driving
to endanger charge.
To protect Maine’s young adult population, the legislature should make the
following three changes. First, section 3103 of Title 28-A of the Maine Revised
Statutes, which defines juvenile crimes, must be amended to include any
misdemeanor charges now specifically excluded from Titles 12 and 29-A.279
Furthermore, unlike Title 17-A offenses (criminal), Title 29-A (driving) offenses
offer no exceptions for their minimum mandatory sentencing provisions. Therefore,
for every minimum mandatory fine or sentence in the Motor Vehicle Code, Maine
must add a statutory provision giving a judge the ability to impose less than the
minimum mandatory fine or sentence for youthful adult offenders. Statutes that
require prior convictions to serve as aggravating factors to enhance punishments or
classes of crime should exempt youth under the age of twenty-five. Lastly, Maine
must revisit the sealing or expungement of criminal convictions for youthful adult
offenders.

271. See, e.g., 17-A § 353(1)(B)(6).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. According to the statistics kept by the Restorative Justice Institute of Maine, the recidivism rate
for YADP’s participants in its first year was 6.7%. RESTORATIVE JUST. INST. OF ME., supra note 220.
275. 29-A M.R.S. § 2558(2)(D) (2021).
276. See Id. § 2413 (2021).
277. See 28-A M.R.S. § 2051(E-1) (2021).
278. See 15 M.R.S. § 3103 (2021). The statutory definition of juvenile crimes specifically excludes
all driving (Title 29-A) misdemeanors that do not have a drug or alcohol component. Id. § 3103(1)(A).
279. 15 M.R.S. § 3103(1)(A) (2021).
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CONCLUSION
To help break the cycle of poverty, homelessness, and recidivism for youth and
emerging adults, Maine must adopt a very different approach for our youngest, most
vulnerable adults. The juvenile justice system’s purposes and correction philosophy
is better suited for youth under the age of twenty-one. Thus, the jurisdictional age
must be raised. The Maine Criminal Code is counterproductive, and often
destructive, for adults under the age of twenty-five. Adults under the age of twentyfive need to be exempted from the harshest of our criminal sanctions including
minimum mandatory jail and prison sentences, minimum mandatory fines, and
elevations of misdemeanor conduct to felony charges due to prior convictions.

